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Female Party Attachment in a Power Sharing Polity: The Erosion of 
Protestant Support in Northern Ireland 
Abstract 
Power sharing hinges on cooperation between communal parties who are expected to 
mobilise citizens in support of the new political system. Yet, women are often ill-
served and their political differences exacerbated by such arrangements. Mindful of 
this finding and using data from the 2015 Northern Ireland Election Survey, we 
examine differences in party attachment between Catholic and Protestant women. The 
results suggest that Catholic women are more likely to claim a party attachment than 
Protestant women and a key factor in accounting for this phenomenon is differences 
in their levels of endorsement and perceived effectiveness of the two main political 




International peace negotiators, academics and policymakers increasingly accept that 
the design and implementation of political arrangements involving the main antagonists 
to the conflict is the most viable approach to resolving inter-communal division in 
societies emerging from deep-seated ethnic conflict. Internal power-sharing 
arrangements among political elites along communal lines has become the dominant 
approach to resolving inter-communal strife in post-conflict societies. In principle, this 
form of government, otherwise known as the consociational approach1 is seen as 
enabling communities that have conflicting identities based on ethnic differences to 
ameliorate and eventually remedy these long-standing patterns of division and to co-
exist in a politically stable, peaceful and inclusive society. By recognising the salience 
of ethnic divisions and by providing groups access to power on a proportional basis, 
supporters of consociationalism argue that not only will communal elites be 
incentivised to cooperate but also to bring their constituents with them in a spirit of 
accommodation and compromise.2 Political parties are central to this process. For 
effective and stable power sharing, communal parties must cooperate with one another 
and encourage their constituents to support the political system. In doing so, not only 
do political parties help legitimate the new political arrangements but they also promote 
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peaceful inter-communal relations.3  
The importance of political parties in deeply divided societies to resolving 
conflict is further underpinned by the ethnic party system.4 In such societies, not only 
do political parties remain highly segregated along ethnic lines but ethnic outbidding – 
whereby parties within the same ethnonational bloc seek to portray themselves as the 
true defenders of their own ethnic group – accompanied by ethnic tribal voting is often 
the primary, if not sole, mechanism for party competition.5 In fact, more so than any 
other factor, it is this issue, or the ability of such parties to act as ethnic tribunes under 
well-designed power sharing, that advocates of consociationalism suggest allows 
formerly hard-line ethnic parties to moderate their political stance and adopt a more 
conciliatory approach to issues beyond the ethnonational question. As Mitchell et al put 
it: ‘With appropriate power-sharing institutions ethnic parties derive electoral rewards 
by competing on more moderate platforms, providing that they reinforce an “ethnic 
tribune appeal”, i.e. the perception that they most effectively represent their groups’ 
ethnonational interests.’6  
Not all political analysts, however, share this view. Some scholars point to the 
negative effects of the consociational model, notably its tendency to freeze communal 
division and political representation along ethnonational lines. Moreover, as the 
electoral success of parties in this instances are dependent on exclusive appeals to ethnic 
loyalties rather than on issues of class or ideology, the representation of the interests of 
citizens outside these forms of allegiances, including the political rights of women, are 
either ignored or considered secondary to the ethnonational question at best.7 Feminist 
scholars, in particular, have been highly critical of consociational power sharing, 
pointing not only to the systematic marginalisation of women and their collective 
interests but also to the reproduction of patriarchal privilege in consociational 
institutions and their power-sharing practices.8 Even feminist scholars who are less 
critical of such power sharing acknowledge that women and their interests are ill-served 
by such political arrangements. As Byrne and McCulloch put it: ‘[While] there is 
nothing inherent in power-sharing that cannot be made more democratic and inclusive 
of women….the failure to theorise gender and recognize gender power relations means 
that women remain invisible in the literature’s prescription for conflict resolution and 
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in power-sharing practices.9  
It is with these various findings in mind that this study focuses on differences in 
party attachment among women. Despite the importance of political parties for the 
stability of power-sharing arrangements as well as their suggested marginalisation of 
the collective interests of women in societies emerging from conflict, to date, the 
position of women in relation to party attachment has received little scholarly 
attachment. This is particularly the case when differences in the degree of attachment 
among women to ethnic parties is considered.10 The absence of such research must be 
considered surprising for the following two reasons.  
First, it is increasingly recognised that the political contribution of women is 
vital for the successful and peaceful transition of societies emerging from conflict. A 
view it should be noted that has been repeatedly endorsed by the United Nations 
Security Council in a series of resolutions on Women and Peace and Security.11 Second, 
as proponents of intersectionality correctly point out, women do not form a politically 
monolithic group. Previous research has shown that not only are women divided by the 
range of factors – such as class, age, race and religion – in terms of their electoral 
turnout and party preferences in established democracies,12 but this is also the case in 
many post-conflict societies where women are often sharply differentiated both by 
long-standing ethnic or religious loyalties as well as unequal access to resources.13  It is 
with this specific finding in mind – intersectionality or long-standing political divisions 
among women – that this investigation focuses on differences between Protestant and 
Catholic women in terms of their party attachments. The article proceeds in two stages. 
First, it outlines the relationship between the 1998 Agreement and the nature of party 
representation and support for the political advancement of women in Northern Ireland. 
Building on this analytical discussion and using nationally representative data from the 
2015 Northern Ireland General Election Survey,14 it then examines religious differences 
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Women, Political Parties and the Northern Ireland Agreement 
Signed in April 1998, the Northern Ireland Agreement is an example of elite 
intervention to resolve ethnic conflict. Based on a consociational model of governance 
and ‘parity of esteem’ between unionists and nationalists, a key assumption of the 
Agreement was that entrenched ethnonational divisions could be accommodated and 
eventually ameliorated through power-sharing arrangements. These arrangements 
included: the formation of a Northern Ireland Assembly with devolved legislative 
powers; the creation of a power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive, headed by a 
premiership diarchy and with ministers allocated  proportionately to the main parties; 
and the introduction of mutual vetoes, or the principle of cross-community approval for 
major decisions taken by the Assembly.15 More so than any other issue, critics of the 
consociational power-sharing arrangements argue that it is this factor – the  legislative 
requirement of cross-community support for major decisions – which not only 
legitimises ethnonational division and exacerbates conflict but has also resulted in 
increasing support for the political extremes, including the carve up of electoral politics 
along communal lines.16  
Recent research on Northern Ireland, however, calls into question the assumption that 
ethnic outbidding inevitably leads to ethnic polarisation and heightened division. There 
is now widespread agreement that ethnic outbidding has been the driving force of party 
competition since the Agreement. More specifically, not only have the traditionally 
more ‘extreme’ parties, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin (SF), risen 
in ascendancy at the expense of their earlier more successful moderate counterparts – 
the UUP and SDLP – but they now account for over two-thirds of the vote share within 
their respective unionist and nationalist blocs.17  This growth in support within their 
respective ethnonational communities has been accompanied by a significantly more 
moderate stance and an increasing inter-ethnic convergence in attitudes beyond the 
constitutional question, such as support for power-sharing and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly.18  A view, or pro-power sharing position, it should be noted that is now also 
increasing in line with the opinions of their medium voter.  
According to this perspective, intra-party competition and electoral support in 
Northern Ireland no longer revolves around the position of the parties in relation to 
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power sharing or support for the Northern Ireland Assembly (issue based) but are now 
based on public perceptions concerning the effectiveness of parties (valence), or their 
capacity to act as ethnic tribune parties in representing the interests of their 
community.19 There is also evidence to suggest that since 2007, when the DUP and SF 
agreed to share power, not only has a period of growing stability taken hold but one in 
which ‘bread and butter’ issues and, more recently, even moral issues such as gay 
marriage have begun to dominate the political agenda.20 This growth in relative 
moderation, however, is not to discount continuing marked divisions between the 
parties, particularly in relation to how to come to terms with the legacy of Northern 
Ireland’s violent past,21 as well as more recent disagreements over a bungled energy 
scheme which led to the resignation of Martin McGuinness and the subsequent collapse 
of the Assembly in January 2017.22  
While there is considerable evidence to suggest that Northern Ireland party 
politics in the post-accord period has undergone an important transformation, such as 
the rise in ascendancy albeit of a much more moderate DUP and SF, this transformation 
has not been accompanied by the political advancement of women. As Brown and Ni 
Aolain write: ‘While a shift...to a more moderate form of government by “ethnic 
tribunes” has been detected… NI’s post-settlement realities evidence sustained 
functional weakness underpinned by a healthy dose of misogynous masculinity.’23 
Despite a separate clause in the Agreement which committed the political parties to 
formally recognise the right of women to ’full and equal political participation’, the 
political arena has remained a ‘cold house’ for women.24  
Even the establishment and subsequent electoral success of the Northern 
Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) – a women’s cross-community party, consciously 
not organised around ethnonational concerns – in the post-accord period was an 
extremely short-lived affair. Undercut by the consociational power-sharing 
arrangements and the electoral victories of the DUP and SF, not only did its two 
representatives fail to be re-elected in the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly elections 
but the party was disbanded in 2006. Moreover, while there has been a number of 
attempts to unite female Assembly members (MLAs) via a cross-party women’s 
caucus – the most recent occurred with the launch of the Assembly’s Women Caucus 
in March 2016 – the primacy of party position and communal identity continues to 
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undermine such initiatives. Even on key gendered concerns, such as gay marriage and 
female reproductive rights, veto mechanisms, such as the legislative requirement of 
cross-community support, have increasingly been used, particularly by the DUP, to 
cement inter-communal party division and stymie any progress.25  
There is also evidence to suggest that some of the main political parties, 
particularly the DUP, have demonstrated a widespread lack of interest in the promotion 
of women in the political arena.26 For example, Braniff and Whiting in their study of 
DUP party members found no generational shift in opinion regarding the promotion of 
female political participation and an overall negative view of positive discrimination 
persists.27 Despite the recent increase in the number of women elected to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly after the 2016 election,28 female political representation continues to 
significantly lag behind that of their female counterparts in Scotland and Wales and is 
still the lowest in Western Europe for comparable devolved institutions. Moreover, in 
comparison to their male counterparts, political apathy remains widespread among 
women as does their greater lack of support for the new political arrangements. This is 
particularly the case when women within the unionist community are considered.29  As 
Galligan notes, despite the Agreement heralding a new beginning in terms of gender 
equality and the advancement of women, ‘the promise of women’s full and equal 
political participation remains largely unfulfilled.’30  
 
Women and Party Attachment 
Previous research suggests that the political arena in the post-Agreement period in 
Northern Ireland has proved to be an inhospitable place for women. Despite the 
promised commitment to gender equality and the advancement of the rights of women, 
there is evidence to suggest increasingly female disillusionment with the political 
institutions, particularly within the unionist community. To what extent is this also the 
case when levels of political attachment are considered?   
Table 1 addressed this question using data from the 2015 Northern Ireland 
Election Survey. The results show that although only a minority of women in both 
communities claimed a party attachment, Protestant women were less likely to do so 
 8  
  
  
than Catholic women. While just two-fifths of Protestant women claimed to have a 
party identification, 46 per cent of Catholic women shared this view.31  Even more so 
among the politically uncommitted, it is again Protestant women who stand out as the 
most detached in their views; whereas just under half of Protestant women who did not 
have a party identification also stated that they were not close to a political party, the 
equivalent proportion among Catholic women was notably lower at just 38 per cent.32  
Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that this greater party attachment among 
Catholic women is a relatively recent phenomenon, which has fluctuated somewhat 
since the turn of the century. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
As the data in Table 2 demonstrates, while party attachment was higher among 
Protestant women than Catholic women in 1998 – 46 per cent as compared to 42 per 
cent claimed a party attachment – by 2001, a marginally higher proportion of Catholic 
women than Protestant women – 38 per cent as compared to 37 per cent women – 
expressed this view. Although levels of party attachment among Protestant women 
again outstripped that of Catholic women by a margin of eight percentage points in 
2005 – 42 per cent versus 50 per cent – by 2010, or three years after the restoration of 
the Assembly in which the DUP and SF agreed to share power, this pattern had again 
been reversed.  Despite a dramatic fall in party support among women particularly in 
the unionist Protestant community, at 34 per cent and 28 per cent respectively, party 
attachment was again higher among Catholic women that Protestant women. And, 
while party attachment has rebounded somewhat among women since then, with an 
increase of 12 percentage points in both religious communities by 2015, Catholic 
women still remain more likely to claim a party attachment than Protestant women.   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Religious Differences in Party Support 
There are a number of possible explanations as to why party attachment is now 
lower among Protestant women compared to their Catholic counterparts, the most 
obvious being their greater antipathy towards the two main political parties, particularly 
in terms of their perceived effectiveness in representing the interests of their own 
 9  
  
  
community. As noted earlier, it is this factor – judgements concerning the effectiveness 
of both the DUP and SF in standing up for their ethnic community – which supporters 
of the ethnic tribune thesis suggest accounts for their dramatic success at the ballot box 
since the turn of the century. To what extent is this also the case when party attachment 
among women is considered? Are there religious differences between women in 
relation to this issue? 
The results in Table 3 are clear. Irrespective of whether a personal endorsement 
of the two main political parties or their perceived effectiveness in representing their 
respective communities are considered, it is Protestant women who stand out as the 
most negative in their views. For example, although a clear majority of women – 63 per 
cent in this instance – claimed to ‘like’ the DUP and SF, at 61 per cent and 66 per cent 
respectively, Protestant women were somewhat less likely to do so than Catholic 
women. A similar pattern emerges when views on each of the parties within their own 
communities are considered; whereas 61 per cent of Protestant women said that they 
liked the DUP, the equivalent level of endorsement among Catholic women for SF was 
again somewhat higher at 65 per cent.33 It is interesting to note, however, cross-
community party endorsement is almost minuscule in this instance; while only four per 
cent of Protestant women said that they liked SF, the per cent of Catholic women who 
expressed a similar view in relation to the DUP was even lower at just two per cent.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
These findings are replicated when judgements concerning the effectiveness of 
the two main parties in representing the interests of their respective communities are 
considered, although cross-community affirmation is significantly higher in this 
instance. While the overwhelming majority of women – 72 per cent – viewed either the 
DUP or SF as an effective voice for their respective communities, only 68 per cent of 
Protestant women as compared to 78 per cent of Catholic women endorsed this position. 
A more pronounced pattern emerges when perceptions of the effectiveness of each of 
the parties within their own communities are considered; while just 52 per cent of 
Protestant women judged the DUP as an effective voice for unionism, the percentage 
of Catholic women who perceived SF as the pre-eminent voice of nationalism was 
markedly higher at 70 per cent.35 It is interesting to note, however, when cross-
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community perceptions in terms of party effectiveness are considered both Protestant 
and Catholic women are almost equally divided in their views. This is not discount, 
however, the perceived greater overall effectiveness of SF in relation to this issue; while 
just over half of both Catholic and Protestant women endorsed the DUP as the most 
effective voice for their own community, the equivalent percentage among those who 
held an identical view about SF was nearly 10 percentage points higher at 61 per cent. 
There is also some evidence to suggest that this perceived lack of effectiveness 
of the DUP, particularly among Protestant women, has remained relatively stable over 
time. As the data in Table 4 demonstrates, although judgements about the effectiveness 
of both the DUP and SF have risen among women in both religious communities, it is 
particularly marked among Catholic women. For example, while reported effectiveness 
of both the DUP and SF among Catholic women has increased by 16 percentage points 
– from 62 per cent to 78 per cent – since the last Westminster election in 2010, the 
equivalent rise among Protestant women – from 63 per cent to 68 per cent – was just 
five percentage points.  This pattern is replicated when each of the political parties are 
considered separately. Again, while judgements about party effectiveness ratings 
concerning SF and particularly the DUP have risen sharply among Catholic women – 
resulting in gains of 11 and 24 percentage points, respectively – they have experience 
only a moderate increase – 3 per cent and 6 per cent – among Protestant women.   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In summary, the results are clear. Irrespective of whether attitudes to the two 
main political parties – the DUP and SF – or their perceived effectiveness in 
representing the interests of their respective unionist and nationalist communities are 
considered, it is Protestant women who stand out as the least positive in their views. 
This is particularly the case when the effectiveness of parties is considered. At just 52 
per cent, not only do a bare majority of Protestant women endorse the DUP as the most 
effective party to ‘stand up’ for unionism but there is also evidence to suggest that this 
lack of endorsement has remained relatively stable overtime.  
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The Net Effect of Religion and Party Support on Party Attachment  
To what extent can these differing levels in party support account for the 
religious differences in party attachment among women? In other words, is it 
differences in their support for the two main political parties, both in terms of their level 
of personal endorsement and judgements concerning their effectiveness, which 
accounts for the lesser levels of party attachment among Protestant women? To address 
this question, Table 5 presents the results of three regression models: Model 1 which 
shows the effect of religion on female party attachment; Model 2 which shows the 
estimate for religion, once controls for socio-economic background and national 
identity are included in the regression equation; and Model 3 which shows the religion 
effect once the influence of attitudes towards the two main political parties – the DUP 
and SF – are also taken into account. The figures in each model are the parameter 
estimates, while the standard errors for each of the estimations are shown in 
parentheses.  
The results support our hypothesis that it is differences in support for the two 
main political parties – DUP and SF – that accounts for the religious gap in partisanship 
among women. As the data in Table 5 shows, although religion has an independent and 
statistical significant effect on party attachment (Model 1), an effect that remains when 
a range of control variables, such as socio-economic background and national identity, 
are included in the regression equation (Model 2), this statistical difference no longer 
holds when party support is added to the investigation (Model 3).   
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Focusing initially on Model 1, the results are conclusive. Religion is a 
statistically significant determinant of partisanship. More specifically, Catholic women 
are notably more likely to claim to be a supporter of a political party than Protestant 
women. An identical result emerges when a range of control variables, including 
national identity, are added to the regression equation (Model 2). Religion is again a 
significant net predictor of partisanship; Catholic women are significantly more likely 
to claim a party attachment than Protestant women.  In fact, with the notable exception 
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of age – older women are more likely to claim a party attachment than younger women 
– religion is the sole predictor of partisanship in this instance.  
This is not the case, however, when the influence of attitudes towards the two 
main political parties – the DUP and SF – are added to the equation. As the results in 
Model 3 indicate clearly, religion is no longer a significant predictor of party attachment 
in this instance. The key net predictors of partisanship are both a personal endorsement 
of the two main political parties as well as judgements about their effectiveness. More 
specifically, women who ‘liked’ the two main political parties and viewed them as an 
‘effective voice’ for their respective communities were notably more likely to claim a 
party attachment than those who did not. With the notable exception of age, attitudes 
towards the two main political parties are the sole predictors of partisanship in this 
instance. Thus, at least as far as religious differences in partisanship among women in 
Northern Ireland are concerned, it is this factor – the extent to which they are willing to 
personally endorse the two main political parties and perceptions concerning their 
effectiveness – which explains the religious gap in party attachment.  
Electoral Outcomes 
A key element in accounting for the electoral success of both the DUP and SF 
is perceptions concerning their effectiveness in representing the interests of their own 
community. More so than any other issue, it is this factor – judgements concerning their 
effectiveness in standing up for their own ethnic communities – which supporters of the 
ethnic tribune thesis suggest accounts for their ascendancy at the ballot box. To what 
extent is this also the case when electoral support among women is considered? 
Detailed analysis is difficult because of the relatively small numbers of survey 
respondents involved, but the results suggest that not only was electoral turnout much 
higher among effective female voters – those who endorsed the DUP or SF as the most 
effective voice for their respective community - but they were also overwhelming more 
likely to cast their vote for the main party within their own ethnonational bloc.  
As the data in Table 6 shows, while two-thirds of Protestant women who judged 
the DUP to be the most effective party to represent their community turned out to vote, 
the vast majority of them – 83 per cent – also voted for the DUP as their preferred party 
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of choice. By contrast, among non-effective female Protestant voters – those who did 
not endorse the DUP as the most effective voice for unionism – electoral turnout was 
not only markedly lower – 44 per cent – but their preferred party of choice was the 
UUP.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
An identical pattern emerges when the link between party effectiveness and 
electoral behaviour within the female Catholic community is considered. As the data in 
Table 6 also show, while four-fifths of Catholic  women who judged SF to be the most 
effective party to represent their community turned out to vote, the vast majority of 
them – 75 per cent – also cast their vote for SF as their preferred party of choice. By 
contrast, among non-effective female Catholic voters electoral turnout was not only 
markedly lower – 54 per cent – but for a notable majority – 62 per cent – their party of 
choice was the SDLP. While the evidence is not conclusive, given the relatively small 
numbers involved, it does suggest support for the ethnic tribune thesis, namely the link 
between party effectiveness, electoral turnout, and vote choice within the female voting 
population in both religious communities.  
 
Conclusion 
Power-sharing stability depends on the capacity of communal parties to cooperate in 
government on the basis of solid electoral support. In deeply divided societies 
transitioning to power sharing, stability hinges on the ability of parties to represent their 
constituents. Yet, in such societies, not only do political parties remain highly 
segregated along ethnic lines but ‘ethnic outbidding’ and ‘ethnic delivery’ is often the 
primary, if not sole, instrument of voter mobilisation and party choice. Despite an 
increasing recognition as to the importance of the inclusion of women for the long-term 
stability of societies emerging from conflict, appeals to citizens along ethnic and/or 
religious lines have dominated party political agendas. This is particularly the case 
among parties involved in consociational forms of power-sharing arrangements, where 
efforts to represent or appeal to the political interests of women are considered 
irrelevant or marginal at best. 
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The results of this investigation lend further support to the view of women’s 
disengagement from party politics in power-sharing systems. First, irrespective of 
whether the Protestant or Catholic community is considered, party attachment remains 
quite low among women. Currently, only a minority of women in both religious 
communities claim a party identification. Second, there is also evidence to suggest a 
religious gap in party attachment among women. Female members of the Protestant 
community are somewhat less likely to claim a party attachment than their Catholic 
counterparts and this is particularly the case when the most politically uncommitted are 
considered. Third, our results point to the importance of attitudes towards the two main 
parties - both in terms of their level of personal endorsement and judgements 
concerning their effectiveness – in accounting for the religious gap in party attachment 
among women. More so than any other issue, it is the greater antipathy among 
Protestant women towards the DUP, particularly in terms of its perceived effectiveness 
to represent the interests of the unionist community, which explains their lower rates of 
party attachment.  
What may account for these findings?  One possible explanation is the differing 
responses of the parties to the political role of women. As noted earlier, although ethnic 
outbidding among the two main parties has now become the dominant form of party 
competition in Northern Ireland, not only do both Protestant and Catholic women 
perceive SF as the most effective party in ‘standing up’ for their own community, but 
of the two main parties it has also been the most proactive in promoting gender policies, 
particularly the representation of women. It is this factor, the greater marginalisation 
and lack of female political representation within the unionist community, which we 
suggest is a key contributing element in explaining the greater political disillusionment 
among Protestant women in this instance.   
The results have a number of implications for power-sharing theory and 
practice. First, scholarship on power sharing must address the link between 
representation and party attachment, particularly as it relates to differences between 
women. As the results of this investigation show, women are not a homogeneous 
group. Moreover, the degree to which parties and their leaders benefit from the 
support of women is neither uniform nor gender neutral. It is to this issue – the 
different experiences and long-standing divisions among women under power-sharing 
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arrangements – that future scholarship should be directed. While much recent 
scholarly attention has focused on the gendered effects of power-sharing, namely the 
greater marginalisation of women as compared to that of men, the differing 
experiences of women under such power-sharing arrangements has all but been 
ignored.  
Second, both political parties and their leaders would do well to pay attention 
to the concerns of their female constituents. This is particularly so in ethnically 
divided societies based on liberal consociation, where success in elections, and not 
pre-determined quotas, decide the number of seats that parties are entitled to in 
government. As the results of this investigation also demonstrate, by focusing 
explicitly on the interests of women, not only will parties and their leaders maximise 
support within their own ethnic blocs but they will also reap the benefits of such an 
approach at the ballot box and in government.  
Finally, greater attention should also be paid to the role of parties and leaders 
in strengthening the political attachment and engagement of women. As the results of 
this investigation also show, political elites play a vital role in the mobilisation of their 
constituents. While much attention has been paid to the strategies used by parties and 
their political leaders in appealing to voters along ethnonational lines, their ability and 
willingness to target and represent the collective interests and democratic 
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Table 1: Religious Differences in Party Attachment Among Women 
 
 (Percentages) 
 Catholic Protestant All 
    
Yes 45.9 40.3 42.8 
Somewhat 15.9 10.7 13.0 
No 38.1 48.9 44.2 
(N) (320) (419) (739) 
 
Question: Questions: Generally speaking do you think of yourself as a supporter of any political 
party? Do you think of yourself as closer to one party in Northern Ireland than to others? 
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Table 2: The Religious Gap in Party Attachment, 1998-2015 
 
 1998 2001 2005 2010 2015 
Women -4 +1 -8 +6 +6 
 
Note: The religious gap is the percentage of Catholics minus the percentage of Protestants who 
think of themselves as a party supporter.  
 
Sources: 1998, 2001, 2005 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey; Northern Ireland Election 












































 24  
  
  




 Catholic Protestant All 
    
Like:    
DUP/SF 66.4 61.3 63.4 
  (DUP) (2.2) (60.6) (35.6) 
  (SF) (64.6) (3.5) (29.7) 
[Base N] [319] [424] [743] 
    
Most effective voice:   
DUP/SF (unionist/nationalist) 77.7 67.7 72.0 
  DUP  (unionist) (52.9) (51.7) (52.2) 
  SF (nationalist) (69.9) (54.8) (61.3) 
[Base N] [327] [431] [758] 
 
Questions: Please say how you feel about the following political parties;. Which party do you 
think has been the most effective voice for unionists in Northern Ireland? Which party do you 
think has been the most effective voice for nationalists in Northern Ireland?  
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Table 4: Changing Levels in Perceptions Concerning the Effectiveness of Two Main 
Political Parties Among Women, 2010-2015 
 
 (Percentages) 
 2010 2015 Change 
  
Catholic:   
DUP/SF - unionist/Nationalist 62.0 77.7 +16 
 (DUP – unionist))  (29.2) (52.9) (+24) 
 (SF - nationalist) (58.8) (69.9) (+11) 
    
Protestant:   
DUP/SF – unionist/nationalist 62.5 67.7 +5 
 (DUP - unionist)  (45.8) (51.7) (+6) 
 (SF - nationalist) (52.4) (54.8) (+3) 
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Table 5: Explaining the Religion Gap in Party Attachment Among Women (n=647) 
 
 (Regression Coefficients (OLS) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Control variables:       
Marital status (single) --- --- .02 (.05) .04 (.04) 
Church attendance (regular) --- --- .07 (.04) .07 (.04) 
Age (years) --- ---     .01** (.01)     .01** (.01) 
Education:       
  Tertiary --- --- .10 (.07) .11 (.06) 
  Secondary --- --- .07 (.06) .08 (.05) 
  No qualificationa --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Labour active   -.02 (.04) .01 (.04) 
Identity (British)   .08 (.06) .05 (.05) 
       
Attitudes Towards Parties:     
DUP/SF (like) --- --- --- --- .32** (.04) 
DUP/SF (effective voice) --- --- --- --- .16** (.04) 
       
Religion Effect:       
Catholic .09* (.04) .15* (.06) .07 (.05) 
       
Constant   .466**  .111  -.183  
R-Squared    .009  .045  .212  
 
Note: The dependent variable is coded 0 (no attachment), 0.5 (some attachment) and 1 
(supporter); Standard errors are in parentheses; a, omitted category of comparison; *, 
statistically significant at p<.05, **, p<.01. 
 




























Table 6: Attitudes Toward the DUP and SF and Electoral Behaviour Among Women 
 
 (Percentages) 
 Protestant Catholic 
 DUP most effective voice SF most effective voice 
 Yes No Yes No 
Vote 65.8 44.1 77.9 53.7 
(N) (146) (90) (176) (51) 
     
Vote choice:     
DUP 83.2 17.5 0.6 0.0 
UUP 3.8 42.5 0.6 0.0 
Alliance 2.3 13.8 2.6 13.3 
SDLP 0.8 1.3 20.5 62.2 
SF 0.0 2.5 75.0 17.8 
Other 9.9 22.5 0.6 6.7 
(N) (131) (80) (156) (45) 
 
Questions: Did you manage to vote in the 2015 General (Westminster) election? Which party 
did you vote for in the 2015 General Election?  
 
Source: Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 2015 
 
 
